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NOTES
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO THE NBA AGE RULE
SUSAN MCALEAVEY
INTRODUCTION
Brandon Jennings, one of the top point guards in the draft
class of 2008,1 had to put his dream of playing in the National
Basketball Association ("NBA") aside this past year. The million
dollar contract that Jennings had prayed would bring him and
his family out of the impoverished and crime infested city of
Compton, California 2 would have to wait at least one year
because of the NBA Age Rule. Through this rule, which requires
that a player be at least nineteen years of age and one year
removed from when the player graduated or would have
graduated from high school,3 the NBA has determined that this
6'1", 170-pound athlete,4 who clearly dominated high school
basketball, lacked the maturity necessary to compete in the
NBA.5 Try telling that to Lebron James, Kobe Bryant, Kevin
Garnett, or Tracy McGrady, four NBA superstars who, prior to
the NBA Age Rule, made the jump into the NBA directly from
t Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John's
University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Vanderbilt University.
I DraftExpress, Profile: Brandon Jennings, http://www.draftexpress.com/profile/
Brandon-Jennings-1114/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
2 Matthew Wells, LA Suburb Sees Murder Rates Soar, BBC NEWS, Mar. 16,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4787252.stm (identifying Compton
as a place where "[ylou have to watch your back all the time" for fear of drive-bys
and random shootings).
3 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. X, § 1(b)(i) (July 2005), available
at http-J/www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20X.pdf [hereinafter CBA].
This CBA will expire in 2011; at that time, the parties will renegotiate the terms of
the agreement. Id. § 2.
4 DraftExpress, Profile: Brandon Jennings, http://www.draftexpress.com/profile/
Brandon-Jennings-1114/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
5 NBA Defends Minimum-Age Rule to Congress, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 20,
2009, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/32012358/ns/sports-nba/.
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high school.6 Yet, unlike other high school superstars who felt
coerced into attending college,7 Jennings sacrificed his collegiate
eligibility to play professionally in Europe where, unlike in the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"),8 he can
actually receive proceeds from his jersey sales and expects to
earn the equivalent of a $500,000 salary.9 Jennings represents
the beginning of a possible trend of players leaving the NBA to
play in international leagues as a means of escaping the shackles
of the NBA Age Rule.
Although intended to protect young athletes from their own
inexperience and the pressures of professional sports, the NBA
Age Rule fails to achieve this policy goal. Taking effect in the
2006 NBA Draft, the NBA Age Rule raised the minimum age for
Draft eligibility from eighteen to nineteen.1" Effectively, the
rule bars players from entering the NBA directly out of high
school. Consequently, the NBA Age Rule withholds economic
opportunity and stunts career development for the nation's most
promising high school basketball players. Thus, the NBA Age
Rule has become nothing more than a creature of paternalism
and cognitive bias based on the unfounded view that high school
players' immaturity renders them incapable of surviving in the
NBA. Unfortunately, the NBA and the National Basketball
Players Association ("NBPA") seem quite content to force these
athletes down a path that they would rather not take.
This Note argues that the NBA Age Rule has created a
problem for which a legal solution exists: the adoption of a
spendthrift trust system. The NBA Age Rule fails to achieve the
NBA's goal of protecting amateur players. Instead, it merely
6 See Ryan M. Rodenberg, The NBA's Latest Three Point Play, 25 ENT. & SPORTS
LAW. 4, 14 (2008) (listing star NBA players who went straight to the NBA after
competing in high school).
7 See David Cohen, Brandon Jennings Poised To Destroy NBA College One-Year
Rule, BLEACHER REP., June 30, 2008, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/33689-
brandon-jennings-poised-to-destroy-nba-college-one-year-rule/ (last visited Mar. 23,
2010) (suggesting that, but for the NBA Age Rule, Greg Oden, Michael Beasley, and
O.J. Mayo would have entered the NBA Draft).
8 See Michael A. McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A Situational
Analysis of the NBA and Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
819, 837 (2006) (citing the 2005-2006 NCAA Bylaws, art. 15.2.5.4.2) (noting that
college athletes may not receive compensation for any portion of the revenue they
generate).
9 See Cohen, supra note 7.
10 CBA, supra note 3.
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limits potential and growth for both the NBA and aspiring
players. Part I details the history and rationale behind the NBA
Age Rule. Part II analyzes the inefficiency of the NBA Age Rule
and demonstrates how the NBA Age Rule unfairly denies
amateur players the opportunity to play in the NBA. Part III
outlines a spendthrift trust system that would permit high school
players to enter the NBA Draft directly out of high school and
would alleviate the NBA's policy concerns.
I. THE NBA AGE RULE
A. History of the NBA Age Rule
The NBA was established in 194911 and consists of thirty
privately owned basketball teams.12 In 1954, the NBPA formed
as a union to exclusively represent the NBA players' interests.13
Working in concert, these two organizations established a
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") that governs the terms
of player employment and eligibility for each team in the
league. 14
Early on, these two groups abided by a rule that prevented
an athlete from being drafted until four years after he had
graduated from high school. 15  Spencer Haywood, a nineteen-
year-old Olympian from an impoverished background,
successfully challenged this rule in the Supreme Court in 1971.16
There, Haywood had signed a contract with an NBA team after
his second year of college-when he was ineligible for the NBA
11 Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning
High School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 117 (2004).
12 National Basketball Association, http://www.nba.com/teams/ (last visited Mar.
23, 2010).
13 See McCann, supra note 11 (discussing how NBA players tried to improve
their earning potential).
14 See Rodenberg, supra note 6, at 14.
'" Section 2.05 of the NBA Bylaws stated: "A person who has not completed high
school or who has completed high school but has not entered college, shall not be
eligible to be drafted or to be a Player [in the NBA] until... four years after his
original high school class has been graduated...." Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see also Jayda Evans, A Long
Rise Back for Spencer Haywood, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htm]/sports/2003588104_haywood250.html.
16 See Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1204-05 (1971)
(reinstating Haywood's injunction against the NBA, allowing him to continue
playing for his team and forbidding the NBA from imposing sanctions).
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Draft."7 The NBA threatened to disallow the contract, and
Haywood brought suit on the grounds that the rule violated the
Sherman Act's18 prohibition on contracts or combinations that
unreasonably restrain competition.19 To succeed on this claim,
Haywood had to establish: (1)a contract, combination, or
conspiracy; (2) the contract, combination, or conspiracy produced
a restraint of trade; and (3) the restraint affected trade or
commerce among the several states.2 °
Alternatively, Haywood could prove per se illegality and
bypass this inquiry. Some agreements and practices have such a
"pernicious" effect on competition that they are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable, and therefore, illegal without the
elaborate analysis as to the precise harm.21 This principle of per
se illegality applies to practices such as price fixing, division of
markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.22
Following the Haywood analysis, the District Court of
California in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management Inc. found
that the eligibility rule represented an illegal group boycott,
constituting a per se violation of the Sherman Act.23 The district
court in granting the injunction, noted that "the rule[U in
question [was] absolute and prohibit[ed] the signing of not only
college players but also those who did or could not attend college
and even those who lack the mental and financial ability to do
so. " 24 This direct refusal to deal with actors at a specific level of
trade amounted to a group boycott. 25 Because of the "Early Entry
"7 See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060. Haywood was able to enter the
league through a "hardship rule" due to the fact that he was one of ten children from
a poor family. See Evans, supra note 15.
's See Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205 (explaining how Haywood commenced an
antitrust action against the NBA, claiming that its actions against him were a per se
violation of the Sherman Act); see also Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060 (noting
the Supreme Court's position that all professional sports, with the exception of
baseball, are governed by antitrust laws).
19 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) (describing the basic
goals and premises of the Sherman Act).
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
21 N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
22 Id.
23 See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1062. An illegal boycott consists of
.concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders." Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
24 McCann, supra note 11, at 218.
' See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1062.
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Rule's" discriminatory nature and its impact on trade and
commerce in the several states, the court invalidated the rule.26
In response to this ruling, the NBA created a new rule, "the
'hardship rule,' which allowed players who suffered from 'severe
economic hardship' to be drafted prior to the four year
anniversary of their high school class graduation."27 Because the
NBA viewed economic hardship liberally, any player who claimed
hardship earned eligibility, and the rule became meaningless.28
Thus, in Haywood, the Court essentially opened the door for
young players to enter the NBA Draft.
Due to the liberal application of the "hardship rule," the
NBA abandoned this rule five years after the Haywood ruling.2 9
In its place, the NBA adopted the "Early Entry Process." This
process declared that any amateur player may forfeit his
collegiate eligibility and enter the NBA Draft provided that his
high school class has graduated and he has made his declaration
within forty-five days of the Draft. 0 Essentially, this opened the
NBA Draft to seventeen-year-old players. From 1949 to 1994,
only two players entered the NBA directly from high school.3' In
1995, however, the entrance and success of "prep-to-pro" star
Kevin Garnett triggered a new trend of "prep-to-pro" players.2
Thirty-six high school players entered the NBA Draft from 1995
to 2004, an average of nearly than four players year.3
Concerned with the influx of high school players to the NBA
Draft, Commissioner of the NBA David Stern proposed
increasing the eligibility rule from eighteen to twenty. 4 In their
July 2005 collective bargaining negotiations, the NBA and NBPA
promulgated the current minimum age eligibility rule. The
current NBA Age Rule restricts NBA Draft eligibility to those
who, by December 31 of the year of the Draft: (1) are at least
nineteen years old; and (2) have had at least one NBA season
pass between high school graduation or what would have been
26 See id. at 1066-67.
27 McCann, supra note 11, at 218.
28 Id.
29 See id. at 218-19.
30 Id. at 219.
31 McCann, supra note 8, at 832.
32 Id.
33 Id.
3 See Greg Sandoval, NBA Wants a Minimum Age of 20, WASH. POST, Mar. 26,
2004, at D04.
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graduation. 5 Consequently, amateur players can no longer make
the jump from high school into the NBA. 6 This rule has forced
stars like Greg Oden37 and Kevin Durant," both of whom could
have competed in the NBA earlier than they did, to defer to
college for one year before entering the Draft.
B. Rationale of the NBA Age Rule
Paternalism and cognitive bias-a tendency to draw
incorrect conclusions based on cognitive factors rather than
substantiated evidence-encompass the principal rationales of
the NBA Age Rule. The NBA primarily justifies the NBA Age
Rule as a means of providing amateur athletes with the "life
experience" imparted from college that is necessary to handle the
pressures of life in the NBA.3 9 NBA Commissioner David Stern
believes that the rule "allow[s] [the] kids another reason to have
another year or two to grow, to deal with the stress, the
discipline and, really, the life experience that would be helpful"
in the NBA.40 This one year of college is believed to transform
immature adolescents into experienced adults.
This bias arises from the widely shared, yet unfounded,
belief that because of their immaturity, "young NBA players are
especially susceptible to nefarious influences" and will "get in
trouble."4' Proponents of the NBA Age Rule fear that without
college, players "skip[] the basic foundation they need to take
35 See CBA, supra note 3.
36 See id.
3' Greg Oden attended the Ohio State University for one year before being
drafted as the number one overall pick in the 2007 NBA Draft. See
CollegeHoops.net, Greg Oden: NBA Draft Profile, http://www.collegehoopsnet.coml
story/greg-oden nbadraftprofile27954 (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
3 Kevin Durant attended the University of Texas for one year before being
drafted second in the 2007 NBA Draft. See CollegeHoops.net, Kevin Durant: NBA
Draft Profile, httpJ/www.collegehoopsnet.com/story/kevindurant-nba-draft_
profile30885/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
McCann, supra note 8, at 832-33.
40 Michael Lee, Commissioner Weighs in on Brown's Suspension, WASH. POST,
May 11, 2005, at D09.
41 McCann, supra note 8, at 833.
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care of themselves and their families for the rest of their lives."42
Consequently, players "make poor decisions that reflect badly on
the league and hurt its bottom line."43
In addition to protecting players from themselves, advocates
of the NBA Age Rule argue that it protects high school players
from those who may prey upon their naivet6. For example, the
NBA Age Rule protects players against the opportunistic agent
who may provide poor advice and consequently sacrifice the
player's NCAA eligibility.' It also limits the damage that can
result from "the injustice... where we make every kid believe
they too can have The Dream,"45 whether this push comes from
parents, coaches, or scouts. This philosophy paternalistically
attempts to save players from potential failure. Therefore,
supporters of the NBA Age Rule defend the rule as a means of
protecting the player against himself and from others.
Although intended primarily as a means of protecting the
young players, the NBA Age Rule provides less publicized
benefits for the NBA. Whereas prior to the rule, the NBA
committed resources to scouting high school players, NBA teams
now have at least one more year to observe players in "a de facto
and free minor-league" college system.46  Thus, the NBA Age
Rule removes the risk inherent in drafting and developing high
school players and better enables the teams to select players
wisely.47 When players are drafted from college, they are also
more recognizable based on exposure in the NCAA. These
players' reputations and promise likely draw more fans to the
NBA. Given the NBA Age Rule's admirable goal to protect
42 Phil Axelrod, What's the Rush? Coaches Concerned Agents Are Swaying Too
Many Youths, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 26, 1996, at D06 (quoting Jerry
Dunn, former head coach of the Penn State men's basketball team).
" Michael Cunningham, The Fountain of Youth; T'wolves Trailblazer Garnett
Best Argument for No Age Limit, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 10,
2005, at 1C (paraphrasing David Stem).
4 See McCann, supra note 11, at 188.
4 Bryan Burwell, Tiger Lives the Dream; McDavid Lives Nightmare, USA
TODAY, Aug. 29, 1996, at 12C (quoting Sharon Shields, professor of human
development at Vanderbilt University).
4 See McCann, supra note 8, at 839 (citing Gary Myers, Clarett Ruled out of
Draft NFL's '3-year Rule' Is Back-for Now, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 20, 2004, at 62.
41 See Mark Berman, Face to Face with NBA Boss, ROANOKE TIMEs, July 6,
2005, at C4.
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players and the benefits it confers on the league, one can
understand how the NBA supports the Age Rule. This, however,
is not the optimal solution.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE NBA AGE RULE
A. Inefficiencies of the NBA Age Rule
Although the NBA portrays the NBA Age Rule as a
necessary protection for amateur players, the rule fails to achieve
its policy goals and simultaneously limits player potential and
growth while harming the league's bottom line. First, a player's
option to pursue college after a multi-million dollar career in the
NBA curtails the NBA Age Rule's driving incentive to attend
college.4" Second, the growth and success of international
leagues serve as a promising alternative to college and the
NBA.49 Unlike American sports leagues such as the NFL, which
maintain a monopoly in the sport, the NBA faces competition
from overseas leagues in both their level of play
and their currency.50  As the dollar weakens and players
impatiently await their chance at the NBA, international leagues
become more appealing. 1 This transition of basketball stars to
international leagues will likely have a detrimental financial
impact on the NBA as players cause fan support to shift to other
leagues and profits decrease.
Even when players yield to the NBA's push to attend
college, the NBA's policy goals still fail. Contrary to the NBA's
claim, players do not gain valuable life experience from playing
one year at the college level. Although many students do
mature in college, it is important to distinguish the lifestyle
" For example, Bill Willoughby, who was selected by the Atlanta Hawks in the
1975 NBA Draft, earned his college education at the age of forty-four. McCann,
supra note 11, at 146, 175.
41 Compare Cohen, supra note 7, with Brian Lewis, A New Galaxy: Beckham's
Impact Felt Around MLS, N.Y. POST, July 18, 2008, available at httpJ/
www.nypost.com/seven/O7182008/sports/soccer/a-new-galaxy-120406.htm (noting
that European soccer player David Beckham's decision to play for the L.A. Galaxy in
the MLS after a career with world-renowned Real Madrid increased the Galaxy's
revenue by thirteen million dollars in his first year with the team).
5 See Cohen, supra note 7.
Id. (noting that because of the exchange rate, international players that are
eligible for the NBA are passing on the NBA and signing long-term deals in Europe).
Retention of these strong foreign players further entices high school players to
consider these leagues as a competitive alternative to the NBA.
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of a student athlete as compared to the typical student. In
addition to maintaining the typical class schedule, Division 152
athletes spend between forty and fifty hours a week practicing,
lifting weights, traveling, playing games, and attending team
activities.5" Thus, unlike the typical student, athletes do not
have much free time to experience college and ascertain the
general life experience that the NBA promotes. Nor do athletes
necessarily benefit from the academic learning experience. Many
star players recognize that they are in college for only one year
and thus only need to meet GPA requirements for one semester
to sustain eligibility for the full year.54 That "the system doesn't
even require an NBA-bound player to make believe he's a
student" minimizes the NBA's paternalistic argument.55 Duke
University coach Mike Kryzewski proposes having college-bound
players sign an agreement to stay in college for at least two years
as a solution to this problem.56 Another year of forcing players to
play the waiting game, however, will not cure this situation. It
will merely add more of something that has little value to the
players and will lead to potential unrest among players and
coaches.
The cognitive bias that players who jump from high school to
the NBA get in trouble also lacks merit. NBA players who did
not attend college represent a disproportionately low percentage
of troublesome players.5 These "prep-to-pro" players are also
52 Division I is the NCAA's most competitive and prestigious collegiate athletic
program offered within the United States. To qualify as a Division I school, a
university must sponsor at least seven sports for men and seven for women (or six
for men and eight for women) with two team sports for each gender. In basketball,
the team must play all but two games against Division I competition. NCAA.org,
What's the Difference Between Divisions I, II, and III?, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
ncaa?key=/ncaa/ncaalabout+the+ncaa/membership/divcriteria.html (last visited
Mar. 17, 2010).
5 McCann, supra note 8, at 835 (citing Michael Wilbon, Graduation Rates
Deceive, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at D1).
5 See Bob Molinaro, College Hoops Suffers When Young Stars Leave So Soon,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 20, 2008, at C1. Because the NCAA basketball season begins
in November and concludes in March, only the first semester's grades affect a
freshman's status for his first season of play.
m See id.
6 Grant Wahl, Effect of the NBA Age Rule, Cardinal Rise and More, Jan. 31,
2007, http'J/sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/grant-wahl/01/31/bkc.bag/index.
html (discussing NBA Age Rule's effect on college basketball).
57 McCann, supra note 8, at 834. Forty-one percent of American players
attended four years of college and eight percent did not attend college. Of the NBA
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consistently praised for their community service and social
contributions."8 Yet even if this bias were grounded in truth, the
NBA Age Rule fails to protect high school players from the
nefarious activities associated with an NBA lifestyle. College
athletes are prone to a maladaptive lifestyle and health-risk
behaviors including, but not limited to: physical fights, multiple
sexual partners, frequent unsafe sexual practices, use of
anabolic steroids, excessive use of alcohol, and drunk driving.59
Surrounded by peers who frequently engage in these activities,
student athletes are more likely to engage in these activities.
Nor does the NBA Age Rule protect players from
manipulative agents or others who may prey on players' naivet6.
Given that agents receive an average commission of only four
percent, the NBA overestimates an agent's motive to provide bad
advice to marginal players.6 ° Yet in the rare case of an "evil
agent," the NBA Age Rule merely transitions agent focus from
high school to college. Whereas before, agents would span the
country in search of individual talent at thousands of high
schools, the NBA Age Rule centralizes this process, making it
even easier for manipulative agents to prey on athletes at the top
Division I basketball programs.
Lastly, the concern that some athletes may never achieve
"the Dream" does not validate removing this opportunity from all
players. As shown from the success of LeBron James and Kevin
Garnett, "the Dream" is possible. High school players have fared
well in past NBA Drafts because they knew they would do well-
otherwise they would not have declared.61 Even if high school
players do not reach superstar status, they rarely fail. For
players arrested, fifty-seven percent attended four years of college and only five
percent did not. Id.
I See, e.g., TysonChandler.com, Rebound to Rebound, http://www.tysonchandler
.com/community (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (recognizing Tyson Chandler
for establishing a program to rebuild New Orleans following Hurricane
Katrina); Pacers.com, All-Star Reading Team Visits Schools, Feb. 28, 2003,
http://www.nba.com/pacers/community/reading-timeouts.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2010) (praising Al Harrington for visiting schools to read stories to children).
' See McCann, supra note 8, at 836 (citing A. Nattiv et al., Lifestyles and Health
Risks of Collegiate Athletes: A Multi-Center Study, 7 CLIN. J. SPORT MED. 262, 266
(1997)).
'o See McCann, supra note 11, at 188.
61 Id. at 159-64. For example, in the 2003 Draft, all five high school players who
signed with agents were drafted and four out of the five were first-round picks. Id. at
157-59.
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example, Korleone Young, a 1998 selection and the most popular
high school "failure," earned $289,750 playing in the NBA and
now earns between $50,000 and $100,000 per year playing
abroad.62 Compared with the average household income in the
United States-$50,740 in 200763-this does not seem like
failure. In conclusion, because the rationales that purport to
protect the players lack merit, the NBA Age Rule fails to achieve
its goals.
B. The NBA Age Rule as a Mechanism for Injustice
The NBA is a professional organization that should strive for
a market-driven result in order to compete and maximize
earnings. This requires hiring the most talented individuals in
the sport, regardless of age. The NBA, however, has chosen to
prohibit some of the most talented players from the NBA solely
because of their age. In doing so, the NBA not only relinquishes
profits, but also limits players' autonomy and unfairly denies
them a life-changing opportunity.
The NBA Age Rule deprives high school athletes of an
economic opportunity. Players who enter the NBA instead of
choosing college may earn as much as $100 million more over the
course of their careers than players who earn a college degree.64
By entering the league at an early age, a player "pay[s] his dues"
and experiences the limitations of the rookie salary cap earlier in
his career. 65 Accordingly, he qualifies for free agent status6 6 at an
62 Id. at 180.
U.S. Census Bureau, People QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/00000.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
McCann, supra note 11, at 115.
Id. at 169 (demonstrating that a younger player has a better negotiating
position than an older player whose career is closer to completion). The rookie salary
cap assigns salaries to individual players according to their draft position for a
three-year term with a team option for a fourth season. See id. at 124-25. A team
option consists of a qualifying offer of the Rookie-scale amount given to the player to
retain him with the team. See id. at 125.
6 Pursuant to the CBA
(i) an Unrestricted Free Agent is free at any time beginning on the first day
of the Moratorium Period to negotiate, and free at any time after the last
day of the Moratorium Period to enter into, a Player Contract with any
Team; and
(ii) a Restricted Free Agent is free at any time beginning on the first day of
the Moratorium Period to negotiate a Player Contract with his Prior Team
and to negotiate an Offer Sheet (as defined in Section 5(b) below) with any
Team other than his Prior Team, and is free at any time after the last day
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earlier age and may negotiate a more favorable contract.
Consequently, the average salary of an NBA player starting out
of high school exceeds the league average.68 Given that an NBA
player reaches his prime at the young age of twenty-seven,69
every year of NBA play is crucial to a player's overall earnings.
This earning potential increases the opportunity cost of attending
college and makes the NBA the better alternative and the
rational choice. The NBA Age Rule, however, deprives a high
school player of making the rational decision to enter the NBA
directly out of high school, substantially curtailing his overall
earnings. Moreover, the NBA Age Rule tends to affect players,
like Brandon Jennings, who come from impoverished and crime-
infested inner cities.7" Thus, denial of this economic opportunity
inhibits an athlete's career development, but it also robs him and
his family of the opportunity to escape poverty and crime.71
Though the NBA Age Rule serves as a barrier for high school
athletes, it permits NBA teams to act opportunistically. Barring
players from entering the Draft for a minimum of one year
following high school gives the NBA an extra year to critique the
player. Although players are only one season removed from high
school, scouts hold them to a higher standard,72 endangering the
athlete's potential worth. Withholding the player from
the NBA also shifts the risk of potential injury to the player.
Instead of rationally placing this risk on the deep pockets of the
NBA, the rule forces the player to bear this burden. Although
a successful college career may increase a player's worth, the
player should have the ultimate decision-making power to decide
whether he wants to take this risk.
of the Moratorium Period to enter into a Player Contract with his Prior
Team or an Offer Sheet with any Team other than his Prior Team
.See CBA, supra note 3, art. XI, § 1(a), available at http://www.nbpa.org/
sites/default/filesARTICLE%20XI.pdf.
67 See McCann, supra note 11, at 169-72.
6 Id. at 166.
69 Id. at 170 (noting that the average NBA career lasts only five seasons).
70 See id. at 216-17.
71 See Greg Wallace, NBA Drain a Pain, CHATTANOOGA TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2001, at
D1 (highlighting the poverty of Kwame Brown and his family as the motivating
factor for his declaration for the NBA Draft); Michael Wilbon, Steve Wyche & Josh
Barr, Stern Wants Age Limit; NBA Commissioner Says He'll Work with Union,
WASH. POST, June 14, 1999, at D1.
72 See McCann, supra note 11, at 177 ("NBA teams expect college players to
make an immediate impact, whereas high school players are viewed more as
developmental players.").
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Although the NBA Age Rule targets high school stars who
would enter the Draft, the rule also interferes with the
opportunities of players who desire to play NCAA college
basketball. Unlike high school stars who view college as a
roadblock to the NBA, some players value the opportunity of
earning a college education and playing four years of NCAA
basketball. Forcing stars to attend at least one year of college,
however, diverts scholarship funds away from these players who
value the education.
C. Challenging the NBA Age Rule
Unfortunately no outlet exists for either the stars or college-
bound players to defend their interests. As outside parties to the
CBA, amateur athletes have no influence in promulgating the
NBA eligibility rules.73 Because so few high school players
choose to jump directly into the NBA Draft from high school,74
these players have little influence as a class to affect the
interests of the NBPA. Furthermore, veteran players, who are
past their prime but are represented by the NBPA, counter the
amateur players' voice and support the rule's constraint on young
competition for fear of losing their jobs. 75 Nor, as demonstrated
below, do these athletes have a viable legal challenge to the NBA
Age Rule.
A challenge to the NBA Age Rule on either antitrust or labor
law grounds will likely fail. In 2004, the Second Circuit
foreshadowed this result through its holding in Clarett v.
National Football League.76 There, an Ohio State sophomore
football player challenged an NFL rule preventing amateur
players from participating in the NFL Draft until three years
after their high school graduation.77 The player argued that the
eligibility rule qualified as "an unreasonable restraint upon the
market for players' services"-a violation of Sherman antitrust
laws. 78  The Second Circuit on de novo review reversed the
district court's finding that the eligibility rule violated antitrust
13 See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
affd, 809 F.2d 954, 959-62 (2d Cir. 1987).
74 See supra text accompanying note 31.
7 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004).
7 Id. at 124.
' Id. at 125-26.
78 Id. at 134.
2010]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
laws.79 Unlike the eligibility rule in Haywood that did not result
from collective bargaining, the court determined that the
eligibility rule constituted a mandatory bargaining subject and
was thus reserved to the NFL and players' union's representative
to negotiate.80  Further, because the rule resulted from a
collective bargaining relationship that federal labor law provides
for and promotes, the rule did not violate antitrust laws.81
Although the Second Circuit conceded that the rule
may "work a hardship on prospective" players, this did not
render the rule impermissible. 2 In the context of collective
bargaining, a sports organization and its players' union can
agree not to consider an individual for employment for "nearly
any reason whatsoever," provided it does not violate federal
laws. 3 Particularly in sports, federal labor law recognizes and
encourages the advantage of allowing the teams to bargain with
the union to establish a uniform system of rules in order to
successfully operate the league.' 4 Therefore, the Second Circuit
upheld the NFL eligibility rule, recognizing that although the
rule may exclude some potential employees, it did not "subvert
fundamental principles of our federal labor policy."85
Ten years prior to Clarett, the court in Wood v. National
Basketball Ass'n 6 protected the NBA Draft from antitrust attack,
provided the draft rule resulted from collective bargaining.
There, the court rejected a drafted college basketball player's
argument that the NBA Draft violated antitrust laws as "an
9 Id. at 130.
s Id. at 139-40 (holding that eligibility rules are a mandatory bargaining
subject because they have tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of
current NFL players); cf Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1204-07
(1971) (staying an injunction against enforcement of the NBA eligibility rule, which
allowed the plaintiff to play for an NBA franchise since the NBA was not exempt
from antitrust laws, and the eligibility rule was akin to a group boycott).
"' Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130 (demonstrating support for policy that favors free and
private collective bargaining made in good faith over wages, hours, and working
conditions).
82 Id. at 140.
s Id. at 141.
84 See id. at 136 (citing Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 689 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
1 Id. at 135 (quoting Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir.
1987)) (stating that to hold otherwise would undermine 'the congressional policy
favoring collective bargaining, the bargaining parties' freedom of contract, and the
widespread use of multi-employer bargaining units") (internal quatations omitted).
1 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
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agreement among horizontal competitors, the NBA teams, to
eliminate competition for the services of college basketball
players.""7 Because the Draft resulted from collective bargaining
negotiations, the court upheld the NBA Draft and its ability
to affect amateur players or "employees outside the bargaining
unit."88
A challenge to the NBA Age Rule will likely mirror these two
decisions. The NBA Age Rule, like the NFL eligibility rule in
Clarett, is the product of a collective bargaining agreement that
prevents amateur players from partaking in the Draft for a set
time period after high school.8 9 As shown in Clarett, an age
eligibility rule is a proper subject of collective bargaining. Like
the eligibility rules in both Clarett and Wood, the NBA Age Rule
is the product of a collective bargaining agreement between the
players' union and the sports organization that is promoted by
federal labor law and supported by the courts ° The NBA,
however, has an even stronger defense than the NFL had in
Clarett because the NBA Age Rule, unlike the NFL rule, is
memorialized in writing.9 The NBA also has a secondary
defense that "the antitrust laws were passed for the protection of
competition, not [individual] competitors."92  Furthermore,
because the NBA Age Rule represents part of the system of rules
that contributes to the operation of a sports league, a court will
likely uphold the NBA Age Rule. Thus, as shown in Wood, it
does not matter that an individual athlete may experience
hardship because of the rule or that the collective bargaining
system excludes the individual's class. Therefore, in light of
Clarett and Wood, the NBA Age Rule is likely insulated from an
antitrust or labor law challenge.
In conclusion, given the unlikelihood of a successful
challenge to the NBA Age Rule and the failure of the NBA to
accomplish its policy goals, it is in the best interest of both the
players and the NBA to consider alternative solutions.
87 Id. at 958.
88 Id. at 960.
89 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125-26.
o See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
91 See Rodenberg, supra note 6, at 16.
9 Id. (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 224 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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III. THE NBA TRUST SOLUTION
The NBA Age Rule fails to effectively protect young players.
The eligibility rule denies qualified high school superstars the
opportunity to make the economically rational choice to play in
the NBA as well as the experience of competing at the sport's
highest level. The NBA similarly loses as players like Brandon
Jennings turn to international leagues, and those coerced into
attending only one year of college fail to gain worthy life
experience because they are playing the waiting game. This
Part proposes that the NBA and NBPA adopt a trust system
through which the NBA appoints a trustee to maintain
a portion of a high school athlete's earnings, solving the
inefficiencies of the NBA Age Rule and enabling qualified
athletes to play at the highest level.
A. Trusts as a Means of Protection
Dating back to antiquity, the trust has been considered the
crowning achievement of Anglo-American law. A trust
represents the most flexible method to control and dispose of
property, limited only by the imagination of its creator. 94 A trust
consists of an arrangement where one person manages property
for the benefit of another.95 The settlor of a trust may decide the
term length for which to hold the property, how to manage and
disperse the assets, and the conditions that must precede
disbursement.
9 6
Section 402 of the Uniform Trust Code establishes five
requirements for the creation of a trust. It provides that a trust
may arise if: "(1) the settlor has [the] capacity to create a trust;
(2) the settlor indicates an [objective intention] to create the
9' See, e.g., GEORGE M. TURNER, IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS § 2.2 (3d ed. 1996) ("One
of the more prominent and celebrated legal scholars of the early twentieth century
described trusts as the 'greatest and most distinctive achievement performed by
Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence.'") (quoting 3 FREDERICK WILLIAM
MAITLAND, The Unincorporate Body, in COLLECTED PAPERS 271, 272 (H. A. L.
Fisher ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1911)).
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, Introductory Note (1959) (noting that
flexibility is one of the most important characteristics of a trust); see also 1 AUSTIN
W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 2 (4th ed. 1987) (stating
that trust purposes are "as unlimited as the imagination of lawyers").
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, Introductory Note.
I See Matthew F. Jones, The Other Family Tree: Leaving Your Legacy in a
Private Foundation, 63 ALB. L. REV. 567, 570 & n.23 (1999).
[Vol. 84:279
AN AL TERNA TIVE TO THE NBA AGE RULE
trust; (3) the trust has a definite beneficiary ... ; (4) the trustee
has duties to perform; and (5) the same person is not the sole
trustee and sole beneficiary."97 Fulfillment of these requirements
gives rise to a legal entity in which a trustee holds and disperses
property as the fiduciary for the benefit of another.9s  The
flexibility of these requirements allows the creator to deal with
actual or potential beneficiary problems, including maturity,
spendthrift, and capacity concerns. 99
In particular, spendthrift trusts serve the "express purpose
of protecting the beneficiar[y] from want and inconvenience by
reason of the vicissitudes of life."100 A spendthrift trust permits
the settlor to provide the trustee with detailed instructions that
qualify the terms upon which the beneficiary may receive income
and principal, based upon the settlor's determination of need.1'
The settlor may mandate that the trustee distribute a specific
percentage or amount of income at set intervals and/or provide
for payment of particularized items that the settlor considers
legitimate (for example, rent and utility bills). 0 2 Unless limited
by statute,10 3 any person may qualify as the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust.104 Similarly, a spendthrift trust can validly
protect any amount of income.'05 Both of these provisions exist
independent of reference to need, the relationship to the settlor,
or one's ability to look and care for one's business affairs or
97 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a) (2006).
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (defining a trust as "a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of
another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create
it").
9 See Frank J. Rief, III, Planning for Current and Future Family Asset
Protection, C644 ALI-ABA 125, 129 (1991).
"o Id. at 157.
101 See, e.g., Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882).
102 See, e.g., id.
" Although, virtually all trusts are automatically made spendthrift by statute.
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 14-8 (4th ed. 2006).
104 Id.
105 Id.
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self. 10 6 These characteristics allow the settlor to protect trust
assets from a beneficiary's own "improvidence[] or incapacity for
self-protection."'107
Spendthrift trusts provide further protection by prohibiting
assignment and alienation. 0 8  Thus, the beneficiary may not
transfer his interest, and the beneficiary's creditors may not
reach the interest or a distribution by the trustee before its
receipt by the beneficiary.'0 9 This protects the beneficiary's right
to receive income and also his right to receive principal in the
future.1 ° Therefore, this trust system safeguards the principal
as the settlor intends, and the beneficiary receives that which he
bargained for on the face of the instrument."'
Spendthrift trusts are virtually indestructible-courts will
only invalidate them if they violate law or public policy." 2 Given
the trust's ability to "provide against the improvidence or
misfortune of the beneficiary," courts have never found that a
spendthrift trust violated public policy." 3 Yet courts will only
invalidate a spendthrift trust if it violates law or public policy." 4
Although state after state adopted spendthrift trusts,15
opponents raise the concern that these funds defraud creditors." 6
106 Id.
107 Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 727 (1875); see also Bennett v. Bennett, 75
N.E. 339, 341 (Ill. 1905).
108 See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 103, at 14-1. A spendthrift provision must
prohibit both voluntary and involuntary transfers. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(a)
(2006).
109 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(c). Spendthrift trusts also have the benefit of
remaining effective in bankruptcy. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 103, at 14-10
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2006)) (explaining that a restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under the Bankruptcy Code). But see
Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 77 (1995) (listing exemption claims that may reach
the trust).
110 Estate of Vought v. Brown, 25 N.Y.2d 163, 173, 250 N.E.2d 343, 348, 303
N.Y.S.2d 61, 69 (1969).
"I Id. at 174, 250 N.E.2d at 348-49, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 69-70.
112 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 cmt. 1 (1959).
113 Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882) (stating that a
trust that defrauds creditors, such as a self-settled trust, would violate public
policy); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 & cmt. a (2003).
114 Broadway, 133 Mass. at 173 (holding that a trust that limited beneficiary's
right to semiannual income from the fund did not violate public policy).
115 See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 103, at 14-7 (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN
GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, at iv-v (2d ed. 1895)).
116 Broadway, 133 Mass. at 173.
[Vol. 84:279
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE NBA AGE RULE
Creditors, however, have no right to rely on property held in a
spendthrift trust because the trust declares this money
inalienable and not liable to the beneficiary's debts. 1 7 Although
the danger exists that creditors may be misled by appearances,
proper diligence in examining the beneficiary's estate prevents
such error.11 Still a creditor is not without recourse, because he
may reach a mandatory distribution of income or principal if
such property has been distributed to the beneficiary or if a
time reasonably necessary for the trustee to make a required
distribution has passed. 19
B. Trust Success in the Entertainment Industry
In 1939, California enacted legislation that created a
spendthrift trust system to prevent parents from squandering
their children's earnings in the entertainment industry.2 °
Known as the Coogan Law,' 2 ' after child actor Jackie Coogan,"2
this law created a trust system to protect child actors'
earnings.23 The law gave the court discretion to require that up
to half of the child's net earnings be set aside in a trust fund for
the benefit of the minor when a minor's contract was brought
before the court.124
California expanded this law by recognizing earnings as the
child performer's property and mandating a procedure for setting
aside a portion of the child's income under all Coogan Law
contracts-irrespective of whether the contract came before the
117 Id.
118 Id. at 173-74; see also Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726 (1875) (recognizing
that all trust instruments are recorded in public offices and open to inspection by all,
thus imputing notice to all potential creditors).
119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. d(2) (2003); see also WAGGONER
ET AL., supra note 103, at 14-12 ("All authorities agree that both income and
principal are transferable and attachable once received by the beneficiary.").
120 Peter M. Christiano, Saving Shirley Temple: An Attempt To Secure Financial
Futures for Child Performers, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 201, 202 (2000).
121 CAL. CIV. CODE § 36.1 (West 1939), amended by CAL. FAM. CODE § 6753 (West
2009).
122 Jackie Coogan was a film and television star who earned millions as a child.
Upon reaching the age of majority, he learned that his mother and stepfather legally
spent nearly all of his earnings. California enacted this law in response to Coogan's
situation. See Saira Din, Chapter 667: Instituting Proper Trust Funds and
Safeguarding the Earnings of Child Performers from Dissipation by Parents,
Guardians and Trustees, 35 McGEORGE L. REV. 473, 473 (2004).
123 Christiano, supra note 120, at 203.
124 Id.
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court. 125 This legislation requires that at least fifteen percent of
the child's gross earnings be set aside in a trust fund monitored
by the courts. 26 The parent or guardian must then manage the
fund as trustee for the benefit of the child while the court
maintains jurisdiction to terminate or amend the fund on notice
to the parties. The child may not access the trust fund until she
reaches the age of majority. During this time, only accepted
financial institutions such as banks, credit unions, or other
registered lending institutions may maintain control over the
trust. 127
In 2004, California again amended Coogan's law through
Senate Bill 210,128 requiring the employer to deposit the fifteen
percent of the child's earnings into a special account held by the
Actors Fund of America ("AFA") if a Coogan trust was not
established within 180 days of the minor's first day of work. 129
The AFA may then use this principal to fund programs for the
education and benefit of child actors.130
Coogan's Law and its corresponding legislation have inspired
similar legislation in other states. For example, section 35.03 of
the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law grants the court the
ability to set aside and protect as much of a child's earnings as it
deems appropriate. 131 Likewise, Florida's Child Performer and
Athlete Protection Act states that a minor's earnings are the sole
property of the minor and provides a set-aside provision for
continued monitoring of the minor's well-being. 132 Coogan's Law
recognizes that the pressures of the entertainment industry force
minors to grow up quickly and face the same obligations as
adults. Coogan spendthrift trusts facilitate the transition into
12' See Ben Davis, A Matter of Trust for Rising Stars: Protecting Minors'
Earnings in California and New York, 27 J. JUV. L. 69, 73 (2006).
121 See Din, supra note 122, at 475.
127 See Christiano, supra note 120, at 207.
' Davis, supra note 125, at 74 (citing Bill Analysis, Senate Floor, Apr. 25, 2003,
S.B. No. 210, 2003-2004 Reg. Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2003)).
" See Din, supra note 122, at 476.
120 See id. at 476, 479 (discussing the services and programs available to the
children).
11 See Erica Siegal, When Parental Interference Goes Too Far: The Need for
Adequate Protection of Child Entertainers and Athletes, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 427, 435-36 (2000).
12 See Stephen M. Carlisle & Richard C. Wolfe, Florida's New Child Performer
and Athlete Protection Act: Or What To Do When Your Client Is a Child, Not Just
Acting Like One, 69 FLA. B.J. 93, 94 (1995).
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the "real world" for these actors by ensuring that they "will now
have their income secured in a financial institution beyond the
control of either the parents or themselves."13  Coogan trusts
serve as a model for the application of a spendthrift trust to
social and economic concerns faced by industries consisting of
young professionals, such as the NBA.
C. The NBA Trust
Given the established history of spendthrift trusts and their
success in the child entertainment industry, this Note proposes
the adoption of an NBA Spendthrift Trust ("NBA Trust") in the
CBA to allow amateur players to enter the NBA directly out of
high school.
First, conditional to entering the NBA, the NBA team
will place the player's salary in monthly increments into a
spendthrift trust with a financial institution as trustee until the
player reaches age twenty-one. The trustee will control and
maintain the principal in the best interest of the player, allotting
a specified disposition of the player's salary at selected intervals
such as monthly.1 3 ' Recognizing the player's interest in the
terms of this allotment, the NBA and NBPA, on an ad hoc basis,
will collectively determine the particular terms of the trust,
including the percentage or amount that should be distributed
to the player for that distribution period. The NBA, like the
AFA under Coogan's Law, may use the principal to fund
programs for the benefit of the player, such as sessions with
sports psychologists and financial counseling. Moreover, the
amateur player's contract will defer his signing bonus, if he
receives one, until he reaches age twenty-one. To receive this
bonus, the player must comply with the terms of the trust,
including meeting behavioral and financial expectations. The
NBA Trust will apply to all players who choose to enter the NBA
Draft prior to reaching age twenty-one.
The NBA Trust, unlike the NBA Age Rule, furthers the
policy concern to protect amateur players. Contrary to the NBA
Age Rule, the trust recognizes that the unlikelihood that a player
will attain maturity and life experience in one year of college
13 Christiano, supra note 120, at 210.
134 Given that players' salaries tend to be fairly large, a financial institution will
benefit from maintaining this trust system. See McCann, supra note 11, at 151.
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necessary to manage the pressures of the limelight. Instead the
NBA trust shifts fiscal responsibility to the trustee, a financial
institution that has actual experience. Given that the high
school player may never have had to balance a checkbook or pay
a credit card bill, the spendthrift trust provides the athlete with
a fiduciary trustee who, based upon the needs of the player and
the terms of the trust, will discipline the player through
monitoring and controlling his finances.
Maintaining twenty-one as the trust termination age will
allow the trustee to monitor the individual for several years,
giving the player guided experience in the NBA. During this
time, the individual will have access to mental health programs
and educational programs that will help him mature as both an
athlete and an adult. Thus, before these players receive their
earnings and signing bonus in a lump sum, they will have
experienced and adapted to the NBA lifestyle. By adopting
twenty-one as the age of majority, the NBA also provides
incentive for players to attend college because they will be
subject to the limitations of the trust if they elect to leave school
prior to reaching twenty-one, the customary college graduation
age. Thus, the NBA Trust encourages players to spend four
years in college and graduate. 135  For those players who feel
confident in their NBA potential-typically those players who
have played one year of college basketball and then elected for
the draft-however, the trust allows the NBA to monitor the
player and promote good behavior. Therefore, maintaining the
trust until age twenty-one guarantees that all of these players
will have gained life experience in one form or another.
The limited disbursements will prevent the player from
squandering all of his earnings on nefarious activities or getting
into trouble-the second concern of the NBA Age Rule.
Rationing his earnings protects the player against the social
pressures and lavish lifestyle of the NBA that Stern alludes to in
defending the NBA Age Rule.13' By conditioning receipt of the
player's signing bonus on compliance with the trust, the NBA
also encourages the player to limit his spending and comport
with the team's code of conduct. Thus, the trust works to keep
the player from getting into trouble.
" Twenty-one is the age at which most students graduate college.
136 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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The NBA Trust, through the trustee, protects the player
from those who may prey on his naivet6. The trustee, as a
fiduciary, manages and invests the principal in a manner that
provides for a continuous income flow to the player. 3 v This
allocation removes the stress on the player of managing his own
finances and prevents an accountant or family member from
manipulating the player and his earnings. Simultaneously, the
trust's intrinsic flexibility allows the NBA and NBPA to establish
a trust that permits the player to support his family if he so
desires. Therefore, because the trust provides the player with
experience, guards against the player getting into trouble, and
protects against manipulation, the NBA Trust satisfies the
NBA's policy concerns.
Moreover, the trust benefits the NBA financially. Individual
teams will benefit from the individual talent of the high school
superstars. High school players have an unusually successful
track record in the NBA,138 which will attract fans to games.
While the NBA may enjoy receiving players who have attained
national fame from playing in the NCAA, true high school
superstars-a rare commodity who tend to evolve into NBA
superstars-would likely garner even more interest. 139 and have
a reputation of evolving into NBA superstars. 140 This interest
translates into ticket sales and profits. Moreover, the trust will
allow teams and coaches to develop and mold the players, both
physically and mentally, at an earlier age. The trust, through
the fiduciary trustee and funded programs supported by the
principal, allow individual teams to monitor the behavior and
well-being of their young players. The NBA Trust and the
programs minimize the risk that a team takes in drafting a
young player by focusing on his mental development and
guaranteeing his financial security. Allowing the best players to
play in the NBA, regardless of age, will promote competition in
the NBA and preserve the league's status as the world's top
137 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 (2006).
138 See McCann, supra note 11, at 145-57.
139 Only forty-one players have been drafted from high school in thirty years. See
McCann, supra note 8, at 832.
140 See McCann, supra note 11, at 146, 157-58 (classifying high school stars such
as LeBron James, Kevin Garnett, Kobe Bryant, Jermaine O'Neal, and Tracy
McGrady as superstars). Thus, fans will anxiously await the next superstar to enter
the NBA from high school.
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basketball organization. Consequently, foreign players who
have elected to play in international leagues will reconsider a
career in the NBA.'4 '
These attributes of the trust system outweigh the incidental
benefits that the NBA Age Rule provides, without depriving
players of an economic opportunity. For example, the NBA Age
Rule's role in lowering scouting costs does not validate barring
high school players from the NBA when an alternative exists.
Prior to the current eligibility rule, the NBA did not force teams
to scout high school players. Individual teams made that choice.
Lowering scouting costs does not justify the economic injustice to
high school players. Under the trust system, if a team does not
want to allocate money to scouting high school players, the team
can opt not to. 42 Therefore, scouting costs will only increase if
the team believes such an allocation serves the team's best
interest. Similarly, although the NBA Age Rule provides teams
with an extra year to critique players, this does not justify
withholding players from the NBA. Again, individual teams
have the ability to allocate or minimize this risk through their
draft decisions. In conclusion, given the potential benefits of the
NBA Trust and a team's ability to opt out of drafting high school
players, the trust places no costs on the NBA and avoids the
inherent unfairness to amateur players that exists under the
current rule.
Contrary to the NBA Age Rule, the NBA Trust protects high
school players without unjustly denying them an economic
opportunity. On its face, the NBA Trust benefits the player by
allowing him to enter the NBA from high school. Rather than
force the player into college (or an international league) for one
year, the trust system gives him a choice. The trust enables the
player to rationally weigh the benefits of increasing his potential
NBA earning potential and shifting the risk of injury through an
early career start against the cost of skipping college and the
restricted financial independence. Although a utilitarian would
argue that the spendthrift trust still deprives one of making a
rational decision because the player does not have complete
I" See Cohen, supra note 7 (noting the trend of foreign players electing to play
in international leagues instead of the NBA).
142 Teams do not have to draft high school players. Under the trust system, a
coaching staff may strategically choose to recruit high school players--or may opt
not to.
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control over his salary,143 the player has the authority to concede
or forego this opportunity. This argument also fails to consider
that the trust benefits the player in that it spares him possible
economic
regret, provides a stable source of present income, and ensures
him financial stability over time. The flexibility intrinsic in
spendthrift trusts also allows the individual to maintain a fairly
luxurious lifestyle." Thus, high school players will not likely
view the trust as a major setback because it allows the player to
enter the NBA and it protects his earnings.
The opportunity to balance costs against benefits also
prevents the NBA from acting opportunistically as it did under
the Age Rule. The NBA would no longer force players to bear the
burden of potential injury or subject the player to another year of
scout scrutiny in the NCAA. Moreover, although not a party to
the CBA, a player who wants to attend college and play NCAA
basketball benefits from the opening of scholarships that high
school stars feel forced to accept under the NBA Age Rule.
Although it does not seem likely that one would challenge
the NBA Trust because of its mutual benefits, an antitrust or
labor law challenge to the NBA Trust will likely fail. The NBA
Trust, like the NBA Age Rule, results from collective
bargaining.14 5  Like the NBA Age Rule, the NBA and NBPA
memorializes the NBA Trust in writing as part of the CBA.146 As
shown in Clarett and Wood, because federal labor law promotes
collective bargaining and the freedom of contract, a court would
likely uphold the NBA Trust. 147
Nor would a court void the NBA Trust for public policy
reasons. Given that the NBA Trust "provide[s] against the
improvidence or misfortune" of the player, the NBA Trust would
not violate public policy. 14 8 Nor would it defraud creditors.
Unlike the standard spendthrift trust, the courts would allow
creditors to attach trust principal because it consists of the
14 See Hirsch, supra note 109, at 15-16.
144 See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 103, at 14-7.
145 See generally CBA, supra note 3.
146 Id.
147 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004); Wood v.
Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
14' See Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882).
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player's salary, and thus, is the player's property. 149 Only the
signing bonus and salary not yet earned would be protected from
creditors because that money is not yet the property of the player
and cannot justifiably be relied on by a creditor. 5 " Therefore, a
court would likely uphold the NBA Trust.
CONCLUSION
Brandon Jennings is not the first to feel the constraints of
the NBA Age Rule, but he is the first to undermine the NBA's
control over players by turning to an international league. His
story alone embodies the inefficiencies of the NBA Age Rule and
exposes the rule as nothing more than a paternalistic creature
driven by distorted cognitive biases. The NBA Age Rule strips
our most talented players of a life-changing opportunity and
deprives them from making a rational decision. But this need
not be the case because a legal solution exists. A trust like that
proposed in this Note provides the necessary reform by giving
high school players the opportunity to make an educated,
rational decision while protecting and furthering the NBA's
policy interests and concerns.
149 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 557-58 (8th ed.
2009) (stating that one cannot shield his assets from creditors by placing them in a
trust for one's own benefit, even if the trust is spendthrift, discretionary, or both).
" See Broadway, 133 Mass. at 173.
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